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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Estate of GERTRUDE FRANDSEN 
SHEPLEY, deceased, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
PAUL J. BARTON, et al., 
Petitioners-
Appellants. 
case No. 17618 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Probate Divi-
sion of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County denying appellants' petition pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3-
807 (misidentified in the original petition as § 75-3-808) for 
an order requiring the personal representative of the above-
named estate to reserve $10,000 for payment of appellants' claim 
for attorney's fees and other expenses which may be awarded in 
their action pending in Carbon County for specific performance 
of a real estate contract. This is also an appeal from the 
lower court's order denying appellants' alternative petition 
pursuant to u.c.A. § 75-3-804(2) for an order granting them an 
extension of time within which they could commence a proceeding 
to contest the disallowance of their claim. These rulings were 
reaffirmed by the lower court by its order of February 25, 1981, 
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denying appellants' motion for clarification of the earlier 
rulings. This appeal was taken on March 19, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the order denying their 
petition for reservation of funds, and if that relief is not 
granted, then they seek a reversal of the order denying their 
petition for an extension of time to contest their claim, if 
it is held that their claim was disallowed. 
FACTS 
On November 10, 1979, Charles R. Shepley, as attorne,. 
in-fact for Gertrude Frandsen Shepley, agreed to sell certab 
real property in Carbon County, Utah, known as the Frandsen 
Estates to petitioners-appellants (hereinafter "appellants') ~1 
signing an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. Line· f 
45 to 48 of the Earnest Money Agreement provide for the recovc:I 
of all expenses of enforcing the agreement, including a reascr~ 
attorney's fee. A copy of the Earnest Money Receipt maybe 
found at R. 42. 
In December, 1979, Gertrude Frandsen Shepley died. 
Charles R. Shepley was appointed personal representative of 
her estate. In his capacity as personal representative of the i 
estate, Mr. Shepley refused to close the sales transaction, 
contending that certain shares of water stock were not part oi · 
the Sales Agreement, and that the Earnest Money Agreement was 
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unenforceable. To enforce the rights they have acquired in 
this property, appellants have already commenced a suit for 
specific performance and other relief against 01.arles R. Shepley 
as personal representative of the Estate of Gertrude Frandsen 
Shepley. 
On February 15, 1980, the personal representative of 
the estate caused notice to creditors to be published. R. 21. 
The notice to creditors shows Elwood P. Powell as attorney for 
the personal representative. On April 1, 1980, Paul J. Barton, 
representing the appellant partners, sent a letter to Elwood P. 
Powell, notifying him of their position with regard to the 
estate's obligations to transfer the shares of water stock and 
notifying him that under the terms of the Earnest Money Agree-
rnent, the estate would be responsible for costs incurred in 
settling the dispute. A copy of this letter appears at R. 44. 
Thereafter, Mr. Powell communicated with 01.arles R. Shepley, 
the personal representative, with regard to Mr. Barton's letter 
of April 1, 1980. On June 17, 1980, Mr. Powell sent a letter 
to appellants' attorney, stating that Mr. Shepley continued to 
refuse to include the shares of water stock in the purchase 
Price, and further stating the opinion that the Power of Attor-
ney under which Mr. Shepley signed the document on behalf of 
Ji , Gertrude Frandsen Shepley was legally ineffective. Nowhere does 
Mr. Powell's response mention or even allude to appellants' 
claim for all costs involved in settling this dispute. 
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I 
I 
At a hearing in the Carbon County Court, the at tor·, I 
for the estate stated that they intended to resist the clai~·-1 
attorney's fees on the ground that no claim for those fees ha: 
been made against the estate, although the Carbon County Cou~ 
had already held that a claim for specific performance did r.c: 
need to be made against the estate to preserve the right to 
specific performance. R. 35, 67. Because of their concern 
that the Carbon County Court might defer to the court probati:: 
the estate on this question, because of their belief that thee 
had made a sufficient claim on the estate if one was necessar:·, 
and to prevent further passage of time from affecting their 
right to attorney's fees, appellants determined that the Third 
District Court, which was probating the Estate of Gertrude 
Frandsen Shepley, should consider the issues concerning their 
right to attorney's fees and expenses. 
So, appellants petitioned the Third District Court fo: l 
an order requiring the personal representative to reserve 
$10 ,000 for payment of attorney's fees in case they are awardii 
in the specific performance action. This petition was pursuar.: 
1 
to U.C.A. § 75-3-807(1), which provides that, by petition to 
the Probate Court, 
A claimant whose claim has been 
allowed but not paid as provided 
in this section may secure an order 
directing the personal representative 
to pay the claim to the extent that 
funds of the estate are available for 
the payment. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
To protect against the possibility that the Third 
District Court might find that it was necessary that a claim 
be made on the estate to preserve the right to attorney's 
fees, and that a claim was made but disallowed by the estate, 
appellants also petitioned in the alternative, in the event 
the petition for the reservation of funds was disallowed, for 
an order pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3-804(2) granting an extension 
of time within which to contest a disallowance of their claim. 
That section provides for a 60-day period after the personal 
representative has mailed a notice of disallowance of a claim 
within which to connnence a proceeding on the claim, and further 
provides that, "in the case of a claim which is not presently 
due or which is contingent or unliquidated • • • to avoid 
injustice the court, on petition, may order an extension of 
the 60-day period." 
In support of their petitions, appellants made the 
following arguments: 
1. The claim for attorney's fees and expenses does 
not require the presentation of a claim against the decedent's 
estate, but is part and parcel of the claim and action for 
specific performance, for which no presentation of claim need 
be made. Hence, the claim for attorney's fees and expenses 
is automatically allowed (subject to the contingency of an 
award of such fees and expenses in the specific performance 
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action), and the petition for reservation of funds to pays.:· 
fees and expenses should be granted. R. 22-25, Supplem:nta~ 
Memorandum in Support of Petitions. 
2. If the court were to determine that a claim was 
required to be made, the April 1, 19 80, letter from Paul Bar~· 
to the attorney for the estate, which stated that "under the 
terms of the original Earnest Money Agreement signed by your 
client. • he will be responsible for the additional costs 
we incur in settling this matter" (R. 44), was a sufficient 
presentation of claim against the estate. R. 35-37. 
3. The June 17, 1980, letter from the attorneys for 
the estate (R. 46) was not a disallowance of the claim for 
attorney's fees and expenses, but merely an assertion that th: 
Earnest Money Agreement was unenforceable against the estate, j 
because of the decedent's alleged incompetence when she execui;:: 
i 
the Power of Attorney. This was an assertion that the necessa::I 
contingency, obtaining specific performance of the Earnest 
Money Agreement against the estate, would not occur, but not 
a denial that attorney's fees and expenses would be available 
if specific performance were ordered. R. 37-39. 
4. If a claim were necessary and was made, but the 
June 17, 19 80, letter was a disallowance of the claim, then 
the interests of justice would be served by the court's order 
granting the appellants an extension of time within which to 
contest the disallowance. R. 39-40. 
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In opposition to appellants' petitions, the estate 
argued, aroong other contentions, that no reservation of funds 
is necessary for attorney's fees, since appellants could claim 
those fees as an offset to the total purchase price they would 
have to pay if specific performance is decreed, and that if a 
reservation of funds is made, it should be on the last $10,000 
appellants pay on the contract. R. 78. 
Hearing was held on appellants' petitions on January 
7, 1981, before the Honorable James s. Sawaya. After taking 
the matter under advisement, Judge Sawaya denied their petitions 
without making any explanation or findings as to the basis for 
the denials. See, Minute Entry, R. 29. In view of the arguments 
made in support of and in opposition to the petitions, appellants 
were unable to determine what effect, if any, the denials would 
have on their right to attorney's fees in the specific performance 
action. There appear to be four possible reasons for the denial 
of the petition for reservation of funds: 
1. There is no need to require such a reservation 
since appellants could retain part of the purchase price owing 
as an offset to cover any attorney's fees awarded in the specific 
performance action. A holding on this basis would appear to 
entail no determination on the necessity of making a claim to 
preserve the right to attorney's fees. 
2. A claim against the estate was not necessary to 
Preserve the right to attorney's fees, hence the prerequisite 
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of the claim being "allowed" by the estate as required by 
U.C.A. § 75-3-807(1) is not met. This would be a holding 
that the petition was inappropriate. 
3. A claim was necessary but was not made. 
4. A claim was necessary and was made but was dis· 
allowed. 
There could be similar spectrum of grounds for the 
denial of the petition for an extension of time to contest 
dis allowance of appellants' claim for attorney's fees. Becaus1 
the District Court's ruling may or may not have been a deterni· 
nation of the necessity of making a claim for attorney's fees 
and of the questions whether, if a claim was necessary, one w~ 
made and allowed or disallowed, appellants filed a Motion for 
Clarification of Ruling {R. 51-52) with the District Court, in 
order to obtain that court's guidance as to the meaning of its 
order denying their petitions. The hearing on this Motion was 
held February 25, 1981, and the transcript of that hearing is 
at R. 65-72. The appellants' attorney attempted to inform the 
court as to their essential difficulties with the ruling: was 
it a determination that they could not obtain attorney's fees 
and expenses in the specific performance action, or did the 
ruling make no determination of their right to those fees and ' 
expenses? But Judge Sawaya believed that denial of the petitic:o', 
luded th:.'. 
fully conveyed the court's decision (R. 69), and cone 
the petitions were denied on all grounds alleged. 
R. 70. It 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-9-
appears to appellants that it was inconsistent for the court 
to deny their petitions on all grounds alleged, since that 
would involve determinations that a claim against the estate 
was necessary and also that it was not necessary and that a 
sufficient claim was made and also was not made. 
Because it appears certain that the estate will argue 
in the specific performance action that the determination of 
the court below precludes an award of attorney's fees in that 
action under the principles of collateral estoppel, though it 
does not appear that that was the intent of the court below, 
appellants determined that the appropriate way to protect their 
right to attorney's fees and expenses was initially to appeal 
from the denial of their petitions. This appeal was taken March 
19, 1981. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE 
PETITION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING RESERVATION OF FUNDS FOR 
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES IN THE SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE ACTION. 
A. The Right to Attorney's Fees and Expenses in 
the Specific Performance Action is Not Dependent Upon Making 
a Claim Against the Estate. 
B. If the Making of a Claim Against the Estate 
Was Necessary to Preserve the Right to Recover Attorney's Fees 
and Expenses in the Specific Performance Action, Mr. Barton's 
Letter of April 1, 1981, was a Sufficient Claim Against the 
Estate. 
c. Mr. Powell's Letter of June 17, 1980, is Not 
a Disallowance of appellants' Claim for Attorney's Fees and 
Expenses. 
POINT II. IF A CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE WAS NECESSARY 
AND WAS MADE BUT DISALLOWED, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR 
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THE DISTRICT COURT TO DENY APPELLANTS' 
OF TIME TO CONTEST THE DISALLOWANCE OF 
I 
PETITION FOR AN EXTE~:':' 
THEIR CLAIM. "----i 
ARGUMENT I 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIEDTfil 
PETITION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING RESERVATION OF FUNDS FORPAYM:r 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES IN THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE A 
A. Th_e Right to Attorney' s Fees and Expenses in 
the Speci fie Performance Action is Not Dependent Upon Making a 
Claim Against the Estate. 
Appellants' claim for attorney's fees and expensesi: 
inseparable from their claim for specific performance. Withe:. 
I 
a decree granting specific performance, petitioners will have: 
basis to recover their attorney's fees. A decree of specific 
performance would fulfi 11 the only prerequisite to an award of 
attorney's fees. Thus, appellants' right to attorney's feesi:I 
an inherent part of the cause of action for specific performar.;' 
being tried in Carbon County. Since, as the Carbon county Dis~ 
! 
Court has already ruled, a claim for specific performance ofa 1 
\ 
contract to convey real estate need not be made upon the persc:;. 
representative of an estate in order to preserve the right to 
maintain that cause of action, the right to attorney's fees ar,;\ 
expenses is likewise preserved regardless of the filing of the\ 
claim with the personal representative. 
Forsyth vs. Estate of Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, (Case 
No. 16695 Utah, filed September 2, 1980) ( a copy of this 
case appears at R. 26-28), involved an action for specific 
performance of a real estate contract. The trial court bad 
I 
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granted specific performance and $1,000 as attorney's fees. 
The defendant-executor contended that plaintiff's failure to 
file a claim prevented his recovery, that plaintiff had abandoned 
the contract, and that the award of attorney's fees was irrproper, 
arrong other contentions. As to the first contention, the Court 
stated: 
No claim was filed by plaintiff, nor 
in spite of defendant's contention, 
was there any need of such claim being 
filed. 
Id., R. 26. After determining that it was necessary to remand on 
the issue of abandonment of the contract, the Court turned to 
the attorney's fees issue, and stated: 
Finally, defendant argues that there 
should not have been an award made to 
plaintiff for attorney's fees. In light 
of our remand it would seem inappropriate 
to rule on that question. If, upon the 
trial court's further proceedings, it is 
found that there was an abandonment, then 
plaintiff's entitlement to attorney's fees 
is rendered moot. If it is concluded that 
there was no abandonment, then the contract 
is still in force and the contractual pro-
visions which pertain to attorney's fees 
applies. 
13.·• R. 28. In Forsyth, the Supreme Court treated the right to 
attorney's fees as part and parcel of the right to specific per-
formance, for which no claim need be filed. The same is true in 
this case. If the District Court in Carbon County grants 
specific performance, then appellants should be entitled to 
attorney's fees in that action even if no claim were filed 
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'1 
against the estate in connection with the probate proceedings,, 
not be 
I 
Since a claim for attorney's fees and expenses need ! 
filed against the estate to preserve the right to obJ 
such fees and expenses in the specific performance action, tho 
personal representative has no opportunity to disallow such 
claim, the claim being contingent only upon the award of such 
fees and expenses in the specific performance action. Hence, 
the claim is one which is necessarily allowed against the 
estate subject to that contingency, making it appropriate for 
the Probate Court to order, pursuant to u.c.A. § 75-3-807(1), 
that $10 ,000 be reserved for the payment of such attorney's 
fees and expenses in the event that they are awarded. Such an 
order, even if it requires the reservation of the last $10,000 
of the purchase price to be paid by appellants if specific per· 
formance is granted, will prevent the personal representative I 
from making anticipatory assignments to beneficiaries of the '! 
purchase money without accounting for the obligation to pay 
attorney's fees and expenses. ·1 
B. If The Making of a Claim Against the Estate Was 
Necessary To Preserve The Right to Recover Attorney's Fees And I 
Expenses In The Specific Performance Action, Mr. Barton's Lettertl 
of April 1, 1981, Was a Sufficient Claim Against The Estate. I 
If it was necessary for appellants to make a claim 1
1 
against the estate to preserve their right to attorney's fees [ 
t laill 1 and expenses, the necessary manner of presentation of tha c 
would be governed by U.C.A. § 75-3-804, which provides in rele· I 
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vant part as follows: 
(1) Claims against a decedent's estate 
may be presented as follows: 
(a) The claimant may deliver or 
mail to the personal representative a 
written statement of the claim indicating 
its basis, the name and address of the 
claimant, and the amount claimed. 
The letter sent by Mr. Barton to Mr. Powell on April 1, 
1980, is found at R. 44. That letter directs further correspon-
dence to be to Mr. Richard Bird, with an address given, and 
states that the basis of the claim for the fees and expenses 
at issue here is the Earnest Money Agreement signed by Mr. 
Shepley, and that the am:>unt claimed would be "the additional 
costs we incur in settling this matter." It would be inpossible 
to have made a more specific claim for such costs at that time, 
since they were contingent and unliquidated. Hence, the sub-
stantive contents of this notice are sufficient. 
The remaining question is whether it was sufficient 
under the statute to send this notice to the attorney for the 
personal representative rather than to the personal representa-
tive himself. The pleadings and papers filed on behalf of the 
personal representative in the probate action show that Elwood 
P. Powell has been the attorney of record for the estate through-
out. His name appeared in the published Notice to Creditors, 
found at R. 21. As attorney of re=rd for the estate he was 
acting as agent for the personal representative on legal matters 
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of the estate, and it was clearly within the scope of his 
agency to transrni t to and discuss with the personal represen· 
tative the claims of which he had been made aware. In addi· 
tion, as an officer of the court with respect to this matter, 
Mr. POW'ell had a professional duty to the court to transmit 
claims to the personal representative. For these reasons, a 
written claim sent to the attorney for the estate is a suffic1; 
claim made upon the personal representative. 
In fact, it is clear that Mr. Powell did discuss with 
and transmit to Mr. Shepley the appellants' claims. Mr.Powel!'; 
June 17, 1980, response to Mr. Barton's April 1, letter (R. ~i· 
46) states in relevant part as follows: 
R. 45. 
I have been in touch with the personal 
representative of the above estate, 
Charles R. Shepley, and have discussed 
with him both your letter and Mr. Barton's 
letter of April 1, 1980. 
I 
I 
Utah courts have not ruled on whether a claim mailed \ 
to the attorney for the estate of a decedent is sufficient to 
constitute presentation of the claim to the personal represen· 
tative. As stated above, that result should follow from the 
application of agency law to this situation, and from the duty 
an attorney owes to the court. However, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals was recently required to rule upon this precise ques· 
tion. In Wilson vs. Culbertson, 599 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Ore . 
I 
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App. 1979), the court stated as follows: 
ORS 115.005(1) provides that "claims 
against the estate of a decedent •• 
shall be presented to the personal 
re pres entati ve." 
Where, as here, a claim made by 
letter to decedent's business estab-
lishment was transmitted to and 
answered by defendant's attorney on 
behalf of the estate, the personal 
representative has notice of the 
claim and opportunity to resolve it, 
hence, even though the claim is made 
indirectly rather than directly, all 
purposes of ORS 115.005(1) have been 
accorrplished. Accordingly, we hold 
that the claim has been "presented" 
to the personal representative within 
the meaning of the statute. 
A similar holding is found in Edwards vs. Brirmn, 367 S .w. 2d 433 
(Ark. 1963) • There, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a 
claim made by giving notice to the executrix' attorney in 
compliance with the statute regarding service on the attorney 
of record of a party was sufficient as being in substantial 
compliance with the statute requiring giving notice of filing 
a claim to the executrix. 
For these reasons it should be held as a matter of 
law that if it was necessary for a claim to be made against 
the estate to preserve the right to attorney's fees and expenses 
in the specific performance action, Mr. Barton's April 1, 1980, 
letter to the attorney for the estate was in substantial com-
Pliance with the statutory requirements and fulfilled all the 
statute's purposes, and should be held to be a sufficient claim. 
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c. Mr. Powell's Letter of June 17, 1980, Is Not a 
Disallowance of Appellants' Claim for Attorney's Fees and 
Expenses. 
u.c.A. § 75-3-806 (1) provides in relevant part that: ! 
The personal representative may 
mail a notice to any claimant stating 
that the claim has been disallowed •• 
Failure of the personal representative 
to mail notice to a claimant of action 
on his claim for 60 days after the time 
for original presentation of the claim 
has expired has the effect of a notice 
of allowance. 
Mr. Powell's letter of June 17, 1980, (R. 45-46) does 
not at any point advise appellants that their claim for the 
costs of enforcing the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur· 
chase is disallowed. It does not even mention appellants' 
claim for these expenses. The statute just quoted therefore 
treats the personal representative's silence on appellants' 
claim as an allowance of that claim. 
Of course, appellants' claim against the estate for 
those expenses was necessarily contingent, both at the time 
the claim was made and still today. The claim is contingent 
on the enforceability of the Earnest Money Agreement against 
the estate, and on a resolution of the dispute regarding the 
water stock in favor of appellants. Those two issues will be 
resolved in the lawsuit pending in Carbon County. Mr. Powell's 
June 17th letter covers both of these issues, by asserting that 
the water stock was not included in the Earnest Money Agreement 
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and that Gertrude Frandsen Shepley was not corrpetent at the 
time she signed the Power of Attorney pursuant to which 01.arles 
R. Shepley signed the Earnest Money Agreement in her behalf. 
Mr. Powell's conclusion that the Earnest Money Agreement is 
unenforceable against the estate is based upon his legal con-
clusion that Mrs. Shepley was inco:rcpetent. However, the 
enforceability of the Earnest Money Agreement was one of the 
contingencies inherent in appellants' claim for the expenses 
of enforcing that agreement against the estate. Mr. Powell's 
letter merely asserts that the contingencies which would have 
to occur for the claim to become an obligation of the estate 
would not occur. The letter did not deny that the Earnest 
Money Agreement provides for the expenses of enforcing that 
agreement, but discussed the merits of the issues now pending 
before the Carbon County court. 
Because the June 17th letter merely stated a legal 
conclusion on the part of Mr. Powell and Mr. Shepley that the 
contingencies involved in appellants' claim would not occur, 
rather than an assertion that the claim would not be owing 
if those contingencies did occur, the letter did not aIIDunt 
to a disallowance of appellants' claim. Because no other 
communications were received in the statutory 60-day period, 
Petitioners' claim was allowed by operation of U.C.A. § 75-3-
806 ( 1) • 
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POINT I I. IF A CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE WAS NECESfilii 
AND WAS MADE BUT DISALLOWED, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETIONli! 
THE DISTRICT COURT TO DENY APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR AN EXTEi;:' 
SION OF TIME TO CONTEST THE DISALLOWANCE OF THEIR CLAIM. 
U.C.A. § 75-3-804(2) provides as follows: 
If a claim is presented under (1) (a) 
above, no proceeding thereon may be 
commenced more than 60 days after the 
personal representative has mailed a 
notice of disallowance; but in the case 
of a claim which is not presently due 
or which is contingent or unliquidated 
••• to avoid injustice the court, on 
petition, may order an extension of the 
60-day period, but in no event shall 
the extension run beyond the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
Where a contingent claim such as that of appellants 
is involved, this statute allows the court to grant an exten· 
sion of time to claimants whose claims have been disallowed 
when it is in the interests of justice to do so. Although 
appellants recognize that the statute merely grants the Distri 
Court discretion to grant an extension in the interest of ju;t 
appellants believe that it was an abuse of discretion to deny 
their petition in this case, if a claim was necessary and was 
made but disallowed. 
The personal representative and his attorney were 
advised of appellants' claim by Mr. Barton's April 1, 1980, 
letter. Mr. Powell's June 17, 1980, response to this letter 
was vague and reasonably interpreted by appellants as not 
addressing their claim for the e~enses of enforcing the Earn< 
Money Agreement, but rather as addressing the substantive i 551 
-
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relating to the enforceability of that agreement which will 
be resolved in the specific performance action. If it is 
now determined that that letter was a disallowance of appel-
lants' claim, it would be unfair to preclude them from dis-
puting that disallowance. By refusing to use its discretion, 
in the interest of justice, by granting an extension of time 
to contest the disallowance, the District Court has allowed the 
personal representative to gain an advantage for the estate 
(and himself as a beneficiary) by treating appellants' claim 
for attorney's fees and expenses vaguely and indirectly, rather 
than directly stating whether the claim is allowed or disallowed. 
It is certainly not the intent of the Probate Code to place a 
premium on deceptive practices, and the District Court failed 
to prevent such a result by refusing to use its discretion to 
allow the appellants' entitlement to attorney's fees to be 
aired on its merits by granting an extension of time to contest 
disallowance. 
Another factor indicating the propriety of granting an 
extension of time to dispute the disallowance is the continuing 
nature of the contingencies upon which the appellants' claim 
would become an obligation of the estate. As noted above, these 
contingencies will be resolved in the specific performance action 
in Carbon County, and only then would the liability of the 
estate for the expenses of enforcing the Earnest Money Agreement 
be determined. There has been no delay involved in the deter-
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mination of the estate's liability for these expenses. The 
issue is a collateral one in the specific performance action ' 
'! 
and will be determined by the other issues in that action. 
Hence, the estate has not been prejudiced by any delays in 
processing petitioners' claim. In addition, there has been 
no delay in distribution of the estate's assets, since the 
parties agree that the attorney's fees may be reserved as an I 
' 
offset to the total purchase price which has to be paid if th!, 
specific performance action is successful. R. 78, 79. i 
For these reasons, if a claim for attorney's fees anci 
I 
expenses was necessary and was made but was disallowed by the 
June 17th letter of Elwood P. Powell, it was an abuse of dis· 
cretion and clearly contrary to the interests of justice for 
the District Court to deny appellants' petition for an order 
extending the time within which to contest the dis allowance oi 
their claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the purpose of obtaining a determination of their 
right to attorney's fees in their specific performance action 
against the Estate of Gertrude Frandsen Shepley now pending in 1 
the District Court in Carbon County, and for the purpose of 
avoiding any prejudice to their right to such fees and expensei 
by the further passage of time, appellants petitioned the Thiro 
District Court in which the estate was being probated pursuant 
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to what appeared to be the most promising statutes for accom-
plishing those purposes. Admittedly, those statutes did not 
supply the perfect vehicle for obtaining a determination on 
all the relevant issues, but appellants believed when filing 
their petitions, and still believe, that the issues of the 
necessity for making a claim for attorney's fees; whether a 
claim, if necessary, was made against the estate; whether such 
claim was allowed or disallowed; and whether, if a necessary 
claim were made but disallowed, the interests of justice 
required an extension of time to contest that disallowance, 
were properly brought before the District Court by appellants' 
petitions pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3-807 and 75-3-804. 
Unfortunately, the District Court's decision on those 
petitions, a si:nple denial, without explanation, did not convey 
any guidance to appellants as to the status of their rights, 
especially in view of the argument of the estate that a reser-
vation of funds would be unnecessary since the attorney's fees 
and expenses could be used as an offset to the am:>unts which 
will be owing to the estate in the event the Carbon County 
ii Court declares specific performance. The District Court's 
decision may or may not have been intended to be a decision 
of whether appellants will be entitled to attorney's fees if es 
ro specific performance is granted, but the possibility that the 
estate would try to use the decision for its collateral estoppel 
effect on the right to attorney's fees in the Carbon County 
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action forced appellants to attempt to determine the basis fo: 
the District Court's ruling. That was the purpose for the . 
Motion for Clarification of Ruling, which resulted in no claJ 
i 
fication whatsoever. In that posture, and to protect their ! 
, 
rights, appellants took this appeal from the denial of their [ 
petitions. 
The District Court's denial of the petition for rese:·i 
I 
vation of funds was erroneous. First, no claim need have bee·: 
I 
made against the estate to preserve the contractual right to 11
1 attorney's fees and expenses which might be awarded in the 
specific performance action. Hence, the right to such fees 
and expenses constitutes a claim which is necessarily allowed 
by the estate subject to the contingency of award in the spec1· 
fie performance action, making appropriate an order reserving I 
I 
funds to pay such fees and expenses. Second, if it was neces· i 
sary to make a claim against the estate to preserve the right\ 
to attorney's fees and expenses, Paul Barton's letter of April: 
1, 1980, was a sufficient claim, and that claim was not dis-
11 ·1 allowed. A reservation of funds was appropriate, and appe an'[ 
I 
would be satisfied if the last $10,000 to be paid by appellant!! 
on the purchase price were ordered reserved. This would have 
clarified their right to attorney's fees and would have preven:': 
the personal representative from making other prior obligations 
for that money. 
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Although the estate has claimed that an order reserving 
funds is unnecessary since the attorney's fees and expenses 
could be claimed as an offset against the purchase price, with-
out such an order the estate will challenge any claim of offset 
in the specific performance action as being barred by the claim 
provisions of the Probate Code. An order reserving the last 
$10,000 of the purchase price will settle the issue and prevent 
the estate from constantly pointing to the "other" pending action 
as the appropriate one for settling the right to attorney's fees. 
Finally, if a claim was necessary but was disallowed, 
the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to grant 
appellants an extension of time to contest that disallowance, 
and its denial should be reversed. There was no testimony and 
this court need not defer to the impressions of the trial court. 
For these reasons, appellants respectfully request 
this court to reverse the trial court's ruling on the petition 
to require reservation of funds for the payment of the contin-
gent claim to attorney's fees and expenses, or if appropriate, 
to reverse the District Court's ruling on the petition for an 
extension of time within which to contest a disallowance of 
their claim, if there was 
DATED this jf.!_ 
a disallowance. 
day of June, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
l!Cf~\RC !. 21RO, :JI, 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
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/ 
/ 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f I; 
I hereby certify that on the ..!::..!__ day of June, 1981, 
I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief, 
postage prepaid, to Elwood P. Powell, CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & 
POWELL, 900 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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